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I. INTRODUCTION 
This article will discuss Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act of 1933 
(―Securities Act‖).1  These statutes provide private rights of action for 
misrepresentations or omissions in a registration statement and prospectus used to 
register securities with the Securities and Exchange Commission (―SEC‖).2  The 
article first focuses on the statute‘s legislative history and express and implied 
defenses.  The article next focuses on the heightened pleading requirements and the 
defenses of due diligence, reliance, constructive knowledge, and loss causation.  
Finally, the article discusses some additional factual scenarios from cases in which 
the defenses of reliance, constructive knowledge, or loss causation could provide 
grounds for early dismissal. 
In general, the Securities Act requires that before securities can be offered or 
sold to the public, the issuer must file a registration statement with the SEC, 
including a prospectus.3  Sections 11 and 12 are the primary private liability 
provisions of the Securities Act.4  As detailed below, Section 11 provides a right of 
action for material misstatements or omissions in registration statements,5 and 
                                                   
* All three of the authors are attorneys in the securities litigation group at Alston & Bird, LLP. 
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 77l (2009). 
2 Id. 
3 There are various exceptions to the registration requirements found at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c, 77d and 17 
C.F.R. §§ 230.501-508.  This article concerns only those securities that are required to be registered. 
4 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 77l. 
5 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a). 
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Section 12 provides a right of action for violations of the registration requirement 
and for material misstatements or omissions in prospectuses and oral 
communications in the offer or sale of securities.6 
There are several defenses to Securities Act claims that are either enumerated 
expressly in Sections 11 or 12 or have been implied by the courts.7  Both Sections 11 
and 12 contain an express ―due diligence‖ defense for defendants other than the 
issuer who exercised due diligence in the relevant offering.8  Section 11 also contains 
an underutilized defense argument relating to the presumption of reliance discussed 
below,9 and both Sections 11 and 12 provide a defense based on knowledge of the 
plaintiff.10  As discussed herein, although actual knowledge of the plaintiff will clearly 
suffice for this defense,11 where the factual circumstances suggest that the plaintiff 
reasonably should have known of the alleged misrepresentation or omission because 
the truth was publicly available or the plaintiff had access to such information, 
liability should be limited based on the plaintiff‘s constructive knowledge.12 
The loss causation defense provided expressly in Sections 11 and 1213 should 
be utilized to a greater degree at earlier procedural postures in the litigation.  Loss 
causation is a defense, and thus it is the defendant‘s burden to demonstrate that loss 
causation is lacking; nonetheless, this argument can and should be used at the 
motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment stages where the undisputed 
facts show that the defendant‘s statements did not cause the plaintiff‘s loss as a 
matter of law.  Numerous courts, including recently the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, have discussed these defenses and applied them to 
pre-trial motions.14 
                                                   
6 15 U.S.C. § 771. 
7 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 77l. 
8 See infra notes 69-73, 83-84 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 85-97 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 64, 80 and accompanying text. 
11 Id. 
12 See infra notes 146-68 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 65, 81 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 146-68 and accompanying text, discussing APA Excelsior III L.P. v. Premiere Tech., Inc., 
476 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2007) [hereinafter APA IV].  The following earlier opinions from the case 
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Finally, it is well-established that a Section 11 claim that ―sounds in fraud‖ 
must be pled with particularity, and thus may be subject to dismissal under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) if the requisite details are lacking.15  As discussed below, 
a recent case out of the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Georgia demonstrates proper application of this principle to dismiss a Section 11 
claim based on the same allegations used to support a fraud claim under Section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (―Exchange Act‖).16 
II. SECTION 11 OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 
A. Statute and Legislative History 
Section 11 of the Securities Act provides for liability for false or misleading 
statements contained within a registration statement.17  To be actionable, the 
                                                                                                                                           
are also relevant to this article: APA Excelsior III L.P. v. Premiere Tech., Inc., No. 1:99-cv-1377-JOF 
(N.D. Ga. Sept. 26, 2003) [hereinafter APA I]; APA Excelsior III L.P. v. Premiere Tech., Inc., No. 03-
15552 (11th Cir. Sept. 23, 2004) [hereinafter APA II]; and APA Excelsior III L.P. v. Premiere Tech., Inc., 
No. 1:99-CV-1377-JOF (N.D. Ga. Sept. 27, 2005) [hereinafter APA III]. 
15 See, e.g., Wagner v. First Horizon Pharm. Corp., 464 F.3d 1273, 1277-78 (11th Cir. 2006). 
16 See infra notes 36-44, 58-61 and accompanying text, discussing In re Mirant Corp. Sec. Litig., Civil 
Action No. 1:02-CV-1467-RWS, 2009 WL 48188 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 7, 2009). 
17 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a).  The statute states the following: 
In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became effective, 
contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact 
required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not 
misleading, any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved that at the time 
of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission) may, either at law or in 
equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue– 
(1) every person who signed the registration statement; 
(2) every person who was a director of (or person performing similar 
functions) or partner in, the issuer at the time of the filing of the part of the 
registration statement with respect to which his liability is asserted; 
(3) every person who, with his consent, is named in the registration statement 
as being or about to become a director, person performing similar functions, 
or partner; 
(4) every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose profession 
gives authority to a statement made by him, who has with his consent been 
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―‗misrepresentation or omission must pertain to material information that the 
defendant had a duty to disclose.‘‖18  ―‗[T]here must be a substantial likelihood that 
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor 
as having significantly altered the ―total mix‖ of information made available.‘‖19 
If the investor made a purchase pursuant to the registration statement, ―he 
need only show a material misstatement or omission to establish his prima facie 
case.‖20  He may then bring a claim under Section 11 against the issuer, its officers, 
directors, and underwriters, any signatory to the registration statement, and any 
expert who has consented to being named as having prepared or certified any part of 
the statement or any report or valuation that is used in connection with the 
statement.21  As discussed below, however, the plaintiff does not need to 
demonstrate that he relied on the registration statement in order to recover under 
Section 11 if he bought the security within the presumptive period of reliance in the 
statute.22  Rather, reliance is presumed as a matter of law during that time period, 
although there are certain fact patterns described below that can rebut that 
presumption.23 
                                                                                                                                           
named as having prepared or certified any part of the registration statement, 
or as having prepared or certified any report or valuation which is used in 
connection with the registration statement, with respect to the statement, in 
such registration statement, report, or valuation, which purports to have been 
prepared or certified by him; 
(5) every underwriter with respect to such security. 
18 Benzon v. Morgan Stanley Distribs., Inc., 420 F.3d 598, 608 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting City of 
Monroe v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 669 (6th Cir. 2005)); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 
U.S. 224, 238 (1988). 
19 Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 231-32 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). 
20 Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983). 
21 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a). 
22 See infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text. 
23 Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 272 (2d Cir. 1967) (holding that there is a ―conclusive 
presumption of reliance upon the registration statement by ‗every person acquiring any securities 
specified in such statements and offered to the public.‘‖) (quoting S. 875, 73d Cong. § 9 (1933); H.R. 
4314, 73d Cong. § 9 (1933)).  For a more detailed description of the manner in which the presumption 
of reliance operates, see infra Section IV. 
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Section 11 was implemented primarily to ―assure compliance with the 
disclosure provisions of the [1933] Act by imposing a stringent standard of liability 
on the parties who play a direct role in a registered offering.‖24  The two primary 
objectives of the Securities Act were (i) investor protection through adequate and 
accurate disclosure and (ii) fraud prevention. 
Section 11, along with Sections 12 and 14, implements the second objective 
by permitting an aggrieved investor to maintain a private right of action against the 
person or persons who engaged in the fraud.25  As the House of Representatives 
Report noted with respect to the creation of Section 11, ―‗the connection between 
the statements made and the purchase of a security is clear, and, for this reason, it is 
the essence of fairness to insist upon the assumption of responsibility for the making 
of these statements.‘‖26 
The legislative history of the Securities Act is also important to consider 
when assessing the intended parameters of the liability provisions.  As Professor 
Seligman has noted, ―[t]he announced aim of Congress in passing the Securities Act 
was to inform investors of the facts concerning securities offered for sale and to 
protect them against fraud and misrepresentation.‖27  Representative Greenwood 
observed of the Securities Act that: 
The necessity for this legislation to help restore confidence in our 
local banking institutions is great . . . .  There is a peculiar fact with 
respect to such investments in that the corporation that issues the 
securities knows more about them than anyone else, and the old rule 
of caveat emptor, or the buyer beware, certainly should not apply to this 
character of investments.  The man who sells them ought to give the 
                                                   
24 Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 381-82. 
25 Id. 
26 Krista L. Turnquist, Note, Pleading Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 , 98 MICH. L. REV. 
2395, 2405 n.63 (2000) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 10 (1933)). 
27 Joel Seligman, Gotterdammerung for the Securities Act?, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 887, 888 (1997).  See also H.R. 
REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730 (―The overriding 
purpose of our [n]ation‘s securities laws is to protect investors and to maintain confidence in the 
securities markets . . . .‖). 
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facts, and the Government ought to require the issuer of securities to 
give all the facts, and be honest with the public.28 
The focus of the Securities Act, however, is protecting the open market 
investor, not sophisticated investors with inside information, due diligence rights, or 
other knowledge not shared by the public.29  As noted by one scholar, ―[t]he sale of 
an issue of securities to . . . a limited group of experienced investors[ ] was certainly 
not a matter of concern to the federal government.‖30  As discussed below, 
precluding Section 11 liability when reliance and loss causation are impossible 
enhances these goals.31 
In reviewing the need for a proper channel to purchase and sell securities 
with the attendant comfort that full disclosure was designed to protect, the Senate 
further noted that the Securities Act was created in order to: 
protect honest enterprise, seeking capital by honest presentation, 
against the competition afforded by dishonest securities offered to 
the public through crooked promotion; to restore the confidence of 
the prospective investor in his ability to select sound securities; to 
bring into productive channels of industry and development capital  
which has grown timid to the point of hoarding; and to aid in 
providing employment and restoring buying and consuming power. 32 
The Securities Act, however, was not intended to be an insurance against 
losses not caused by wrongdoing.33  In commenting on the Securities Act, President 
                                                   
28 Turnquist, supra note 26, at 2404 n.50 (quoting 77 CONG. REC. 2914 (1933) (statement of Rep. 
Greenwood)). 
29 James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 37 
(1959-60). 
30 Id. 
31 See infra notes 122-30 and accompanying text. 
32 Seligman, supra note 27, at 888 (quoting S. REP. NO. 73-47 (1933)); see also Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 
513 U.S. 561, 571 (1995) (noting that the meaningful change effected by the Securities Act was ―the 
creation of federal duties—for the most part, registration and disclosure obligations—in connection 
with public offerings‖). 
33 Henry Klehm III, Contractual Shifting of Defense Costs in Private Offering Securities Litigation, 136 U. PA. L. 
REV. 971, 974 (1988) (quoting President Franklin D. Roosevelt‘s Message to the Senate Concerning 
Regulation of Securities Issues, 77 CONG. REC. 937 (1933). 
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Roosevelt underscored its twin objectives – investor protection and fraud 
prevention.34  In his report to Congress, he made it apparent that the Securities Act 
was necessary in order to foster and promote a degree of openness and honesty in 
the securities market that had theretofore been absent.35 
[T]he Federal Government cannot and should not take any action 
which might be construed as approving or guaranteeing that newly 
issued securities are sound in the sense that their value will be 
maintained or that the properties which they represent will earn 
profit.  There is, however, an obligation upon us to insist that every 
issue of new securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall be 
accompanied by full publicity and information, and that no essentially 
important element attending the issue shall be concealed from the 
buying public.  This proposal . . . puts the burden of telling the whole 
truth on the seller . . . .  The purpose of the legislation I suggest is to 
protect the public with the least possible interference to honest 
business.36 
Under the Section 11 liability construct, the registration statement is intended 
to provide open market investors with a reserve of reliable information upon which 
to make investment decisions.37  But it is the authors‘ view – buttressed by case law 
and legislative history – that investors who did not rely on the market and instead 
evaluated investment decisions based on inside information were not intended to fall 
under the protective umbrella of Section 11 of the Securities Act.38  It was believed 
by the authors of the legislation that ―bureaucracy, untrained in these matters as it 
was, could hardly equal these investors for sophistication, provided only it was their 
own money that they were spending.‖39 
                                                   
34 Id. at 974-75. 
35 Id. at 974. 
36 Id. at 974. 
37 Elizabeth T. Tsai, Annotation, What Constitutes a “Public Offering” Within Meaning of § 4(2) of Securities 
Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C.A. § 77d(2)), Exempting From Its Registration and Prospectus Requirements Transactions 
by an Issuer Not Involving “Any Public Offering,” 6 A.L.R. FED. 536, *2a (1971). 
38 See United States Securities and Exchange Commission, The Laws that Govern the Securities 
Industry, http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml. 
39 Landis, supra note 29, at 37. 
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In as much as the Securities Act does not provide a cause of action for fraud, 
it does create a lower standard for establishing liability than the Exchange Act.40  A 
Section 11 claim, for example, does not require proof of scienter.41 
In light of the comparatively low burden under Section 11 and the intent of 
the statute, the pool of potential purchasers who would qualify to bring a claim 
under Section 11 has been defined narrowly.42  Because the registration statement 
and prospectus are ―snapshots‖ of the financial picture of the company at the time 
of the offering, the Securities Act protects investors who purchase directly in the 
offering or, as discussed below, ―traceable‖ to the offering.43  Thus, unlike a claim 
brought under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, only certain after-market 
purchasers have standing.44  Artificially expanding the pool of potential plaintiffs 
chills issuers in a manner inconsistent with the intent of the Securities Act.45 
Federal case law has routinely recognized the narrow scope of liability under 
the Securities Act.46  Indeed, where fraud has really been committed and where a 
shareholder plaintiff really has been injured as a direct result of the fraud, Section 
10(b) of the Exchange Act would be the typical remedy.47 
Accordingly, as discussed fully below, the authors believe precedent and 
legislative history teach that there should be no liability under Section 11 where a 
plaintiff is a sophisticated investor, has access to insider information, benefits from 
due diligence rights and obligations, or otherwise should have known of the allegedly 
                                                   
40 See, e.g., In re Unicapital Corp. Sec. Litig., 149 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1363 (S.D. Fla. 2001).  The 
Exchange Act imposes a greater burden of proof on plaintiffs and, as a result, does not demand that 
the potential class of plaintiffs who may bring claims thereunder be restricted.  In particular, claims 
under the Exchange Act place on plaintiffs the significant onus to prove that a defendant acted with 
scienter.  See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007). 
41 See, e.g., In re Adams Golf, Inc. Sec. Litig., 381 F.3d 267, 274 n.7 (3d Cir. 2004). 
42 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2009). 
43 See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 578 (1995); Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 
893, 904 (5th Cir. 1977); Guenther v. Cooper Life Scis. Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1437, 1439 (N.D. Cal. 
1990); APA II, supra note 14, at 16. 
47 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2009). 
2010]              DEFENSES TO CLAIMS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933               61 
 
 
misleading information.  Congress said as much in enacting the statute when it stated 
that ―he should suffer the loss who occupies a position of trust in the issuing 
corporation toward the stockholders, rather than the buyer of a stock who must rely 
upon what he is told.‖48  Furthermore, courts have recognized the sensibility of the 
premise by holding that ―Section 11 [liability] is imposed and justified because 
members of the public are presumed to be ‗innocent‘ and, as compared with the 
issuers of stock, do not have the ‗opportunity to learn the truth;‘ instead, they are 
merely reliant upon what they are told.‖49 
B. Heightened Pleading Requirements for Section 11 Claims that “Sound in Fraud”  
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires plaintiffs to plead with 
particularity facts satisfying each element of claims falling within the purview of the 
rule.50  Even before Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act51 in 
1995 to heighten the pleading requirements of securities fraud claims, courts held 
that Rule 9(b) applied to claims where reputational concerns were implicated, 
including Securities Act claims.52 
It is now well established in many federal circuits that Section 11 claims that 
―sound in fraud‖ must be pled with particularity in conformance with Rule 9(b).53  A 
claim ―sounds in fraud‖ where ―the facts underlying the misrepresentation at stake in 
                                                   
48 S. REP. NO. 73-47, at 5 (1933). 
49 APA IV, supra note 14, at 1277 (quoting S. REP. NO. 73-47, at 5 (1933)). 
50 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
51 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2009). 
52 See Sears v. Likens, 912 F.2d 889, 893 (7th Cir. 1990); DiVittorio v. Equidyne Extractive Indus., 
Inc., 822 F.2d 1242, 1247 (2d Cir. 1987); Sears v. Likens, 912 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Elscint, 
Ltd. Sec. Litig., 674 F. Supp. 374, 384 (D. Mass. 1987); Fine v. Rubin, 623 F. Supp. 171, 172 (N.D. 
Cal. 1985); Competitive Assocs., Inc. v. Fire Fly Enter., Inc., 59 F.R.D. 336, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
53 See Wagner v. First Horizon Pharm. Corp., 464 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir. 2006); Cal. Pub. 
Employees‘ Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 161 (3d Cir. 2004); Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 
164, 171 (2d Cir. 2004); Lone Star Ladies Inv. Club v. Schlotzsky‘s, Inc., 238 F.3d 363, 368 (5th Cir. 
2001); In re Stac Elecs. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d 1399, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1996); Sears, 912 F.2d at 892-93.  Cf. 
In re NationsMart Corp. Sec. Litig., 130 F.3d 309, 314-15 (8th Cir. 1997) (recognizing the applicability 
of Rule 9(b) to Section 11 claims ―grounded in fraud,‖ while holding that Rule 9(b) did not apply in 
the instant case). 
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the claim are said to be part of a fraud claim, as alleged elsewhere in the complaint.‖54  
The Eleventh Circuit held as follows: 
It is not enough to claim that alternative pleading saves the non-fraud 
claims from making an allegation of fraud because the risk to a 
defendant‘s reputation is not protected.  It would strain credulity to 
claim that Rule 9(b) should not apply in this allegation: [t]he 
defendant is a no good defrauder, but, even if he is not, the plaintiff 
can still recover based on the simple untruth of the otherwise 
fraudulent statement.  Nor is it enough to present a general 
disclaimer in an attempt to immunize the non-fraud claims from the 
Rule 9 requirements, for the same common sense reasons.  The 
purpose of the rule is to protect a defendant‘s good will and 
reputation when that defendant‘s conduct is alleged to have been 
fraudulent.55 
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia 
recently applied this principle to dismiss a Section 11 claim based on the same facts, 
which the court held failed to state a Section 10(b) claim.56  In In re Mirant Corporation 
Securities Litigation, the plaintiffs‘ Section 11 and Section 10(b) claims were based on 
the allegation that defendants violated the federal securities laws by failing to disclose 
that Mirant engaged in purported illegal Enron-type energy trading and some 
accounting errors.57 
The court held that the heightened pleading standards of Rule 9(b) applied 
because the Section 11 claims sounded in fraud; for example, the allegations against 
the Section 11 defendants were ―inextricably intertwined with their allegations 
against the [Section 10(b) defendants].‖58  Specifically, plaintiffs had incorporated in 
the Securities Act count ―hundreds of pages of mostly fraud allegations before 
employing the disfavored‖ general disclaimer of fraud.59  Moreover, every single 
                                                   
54 Wagner, 464 F.3d at 1278. 
55 Id. 
56 In re Mirant Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 1:02-CV-1467-RWS, 2009 WL 48188, at *17 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 7, 
2009).  Authors Todd R. David and Jessica P. Corley were defense counsel in the Mirant case. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at *15. 
59 Id. 
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alleged misstatement or omission on which plaintiffs based their Section 11 claim 
was also alleged as a fraudulent misstatement or omission against the former 
officers.60  Based in part on this holding, the court dismissed the Section 11 and 
Section 10(b) claims.61 
Thus, the heightened pleading standards should apply to a Section 11 claim 
with fraud at its core.  As demonstrated by the Mirant case, courts continue to take a 
hard look at the underlying allegations to determine if plaintiffs have met their 
burden of pleading a misrepresentation or omission of material fact in the relevant 
offering document. 
C. Express Defenses under Section 11 
Section 11 contains several express defenses.  First, the defendant can show 
that there simply was no materially false or misleading statement or omission 
contained within the registration statement at issue.62  Section 11 is not designed to 
punish something that is not misleading or was disclosed.  Second, if the plaintiff 
knew of the misstatement or omission and made his purchase notwithstanding, no 
liability can be imposed.63  Another defense to a Section 11 claim is lack of loss 
causation, which exists when the defendant is able to demonstrate that any damages 
the plaintiff claims to have sustained were the result of something other than the 
alleged misstatement or omission in the registration statement.64  In addition, the 
                                                   
60 Id. 
61 Id. at *16. 
62 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2009). 
63 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)id. (―unless it is proved that at the time of such acquisition [the investor] knew 
of such untruth or omission.‖); see also Miles v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 483 F.3d 70, 73 n.1 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(acknowledging the defense that ―the plaintiff knew of the untruth or omission at the time of his or 
her acquisition of the security.‖) (quoting IX LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES 
REGULATION 4528 (3d ed. 2004)).  For more discussion on the constructive knowledge aspect of this 
defense, see discussion infra at Section III(C). 
64 See Miles, 483 F.3d at 73 n.1; In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261, 274 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(―[D]efendants can limit damages by showing that the plaintiffs‘ losses were caused by something 
other than their misrepresentations.‖); Miles, 483 F.3d at 73 n.1; Campbell v. Shearson/Am. Express 
Inc., No. 85-1703, 1987 WL 44742, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 9, 1987); Smith v. Suprema Specialties, Inc., 
No. 02-168 (WHW), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30001, at *24WL 1217980, at *6-7 (D.N.J. Apr. 23, 
2007); Campbell v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., No. 85-1703, 1987 WL 44742 (6th Cir. Sept. 9, 1987); see 
also discussion infra at Section V. 
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plaintiff must be able to ―trace‖ his purchase of the stock to the defective 
registration statement.65  To trace, the plaintiff must be able to prove that the only 
shares in the market at the time he purchased his shares were those issued pursuant 
to the allegedly false registration statement.66  If, for example, the defendant can 
show that the investor purchased the stock in a prior offering, and thus before the 
defective registration statement was issued, the plaintiff ‘s claim under Section 11 will 
fail.67 
Section 11 also provides a defense for all defendants (other than the issuer) 
that acted reasonably and in good faith (the ―due diligence‖ defense).68  Specifically, a 
non-issuer defendant avoids liability under Section 11 if he can prove as to non-
―expertized‖ portions of the registration statement that ―he had, after reasonable 
investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe‖ there were no 
misstatements or omissions of material facts in such portions of the registration 
statement.69 
Section 11 also shields defendants from liability for material misstatements or 
omissions in information provided by experts.70  It is well established that an 
accountant qualifies as an expert, and audited financial statements are considered 
―expertized‖ portions of a registration statement.71  As to ―expertized‖ portions of 
the registration statement (such as audited financial statements), a non-issuer 
defendant avoids liability if he can prove that he ―‗had no reasonable ground to 
believe and did not believe‘‖ that such portions of the registration statement 
contained misstatements or omissions of material facts.72  Thus, a reasonable 
                                                   
65 See APA IV, 476 F.3d, supra note 14, at 1276; Lee v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 294 F.3d 969, 977-78 
(8th Cir. 2002); Johnson v. NYFIX, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 2d 105, 118 (D. Conn. 2005).  Sections 11 and 
12 include additional defenses, such as the due diligence defense, that are beyond the scope of this 
article, and thus not discussed herein. 
66 See APA IV, supra note 14, at 1276; Lee, 294 F.3d at 978; Johnson, 399 F. Supp. 2d at 118. 
67 See APA IV, supra note 14, at 1276; Johnson, 399 F. Supp. 2d at 118. 
68 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (2009); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 211 (1976). 
69 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(B). 
70 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(C). 
71 See, e.g., In re Software Toolworks Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 615, 623 (9th Cir. 1994). 
72 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(C)). 
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investigation standard applies to non-―expertized‖ portions, while a reasonable 
reliance standard applies to ―expertized‖ portions. 
III. SECTION 12 OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 
A. Statute and Legislative History 
Section 12 of the Securities Act provides for liability for false or misleading 
statements contained within prospectuses or as part of oral communications.73  
Although the legislative history behind Section 12 is ―sparse,‖ 74 the statute was 
enacted primarily for the same reason as Section 11 – i.e., investor protection and 
fraud prevention.  As explained by Senator Duncan Fletcher, the Securities Act was 
designed to protect: 
[p]eople [who] have been persuaded to invest their money in 
securities without any information respecting them, except the 
advertisements put forth by the agents or representatives of those 
                                                   
73 See 15 U.S.C. § 77l (2009).  The statute provides as follows: 
Any person who – 
(1) offers or sells a security in violation of section 77e of this title, or 
(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the provisions of section 
77c of this title, other than paragraphs (2) and (14) of subsection (a) of said 
section), by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or 
communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus 
or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or 
omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light 
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser 
not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of 
proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have 
known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable, subject to subsection (b) of this 
section, to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at 
law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration 
paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received 
thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the 
security. 
15 U.S.C. § 77l(a). 
74 See, e.g., Therese Maynard, The Future of Securities Act Section 12(2), 45 ALA. L. REV. 817, 842-43 
(1994). 
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issuing the securities, and such advertisements have not given full 
information to the public.75 
Indeed, the House Report observed as follows: 
The character of civil liabilities imposed by this bill [is] described in 
detail elsewhere.  Their essential characteristic consists of a 
requirement that all those responsible for statements upon the face of 
which the public is solicited to invest its money shall be held to 
standards like those imposed by law upon a fiduciary. . . .  The bill 
affects only new offerings of securities . . . .  It does not affect the 
ordinary redistribution of securities unless such redistribution takes 
on the characteristics of a new offering by reason of the control of 
the issuer possessed by those responsible for the offering.76 
It is clear that Congress was concerned about the negative effects of false or 
misleading information, particularly given the complexity most often associated with 
the financial transactions and background surrounding securities offerings in general. 
The purpose of these sections is to secure for potential buyers the 
means of understanding the intricacies of the transaction into which 
they are invited.  The full revelations required in the filed 
―registration statement‖ should not be lost in the actual selling 
process.  This requirement will undoubtedly limit the selling 
arguments hitherto employed.  That is its purpose. . . .  Any objection 
that the compulsory incorporation in selling literature and sales 
argument of substantially all information concerning the issue, will 
frighten the buyer with the intricacy of the transaction, states one of 
the best arguments for the provision.77 
B. Express Defenses Under Section 12 
Section 12 defenses are similar to the defenses available under Section 11.  
For example, the defendant may show that the prospectus or oral communication at 
                                                   
75 77 CONG. REC. 2961, 2982 (1933). 
76 H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 5 (1933) (to accompany H.R. 5480, 73d Congress (1933)). 
77 Id. at *8. 
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issue did not contain a materially false or misleading statement or omission.78  In 
addition, there is a knowledge defense, i.e., the defendant may demonstrate that the 
plaintiff was aware of the misstatement or omission in connection with the purchase 
of the security.79  There is also a loss causation defense if the defendant can prove 
that the damages the plaintiff claims to have sustained were the result of something 
other than the supposed misstatement or omission in the prospectus or oral 
communication.80 
The standing requirement is stricter under Section 12 than under Section 11.  
Under Section 12, the plaintiff must also show that he purchased the securities 
directly in the offering and not in the aftermarket.81 
Similar to the due diligence defense of Section 11, Section 12(a)(2) provides a 
defense of reasonable care for all defendants ―that is less demanding than the duty of 
due diligence.‖82  This ―lack of negligence‖ defense provides that a defendant shall 
not be liable if he ―sustain[s] the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the 
exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission‖ 
which is ―necessary in order to make the statements, in light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading.‖83 
As noted above, the defenses in Sections 11 and 12 are rarely used in 
dispositive motion practice.  The next section of the article discusses the application 
of four specific defenses – reliance, constructive knowledge, loss causation, and 
truth-on-the-market – that provide useful tools for early dismissal. 
                                                   
78 See 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a); see also Gasner v. Bd. of Supervisors, 103 F.3d 351, 358 (4th Cir. 1996). 
79 15 U.S.C. § 771(a). 
80 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77l(a), (b).  Although the plaintiff need not prove loss causation, transaction 
causation is required.  The plaintiff must prove that the misrepresentation caused him to enter into 
the transaction, even if such causation does not rise to the level of reliance.  See Beloit Corp. v. Emett 
& Chandler Cos., No. 90-55154, 1991 WL 153459, at *4 (9th Cir. Aug. 14, 1991); Smolen v. Deloitte, 
Haskins & Sells, 921 F.2d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 1990); Barnes v. Res. Royalties, Inc., 795 F.2d 1359, 1366 
n.9 (8th Cir. 1986). 
81 See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 571 (1995); see also Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 
272, 287 n.16 (3d Cir. 1992). 
82 In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see also 15 U.S.C. § 
77l(a)(2); Royal Am. Managers, Inc. v. IRC Holding Corp., 885 F.2d 1011, 1019 (2d Cir. 1989). 
83 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2). 
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IV. THE PRESUMPTION OF RELIANCE UNDER SECTION 11 
As noted above, there is a presumption under Section 11 that the investor 
relied on the false or misleading statement at issue, and therefore he does not need to 
show independently that he relied on the alleged misstatement in purchasing or 
selling the securities.84  In that regard, a Section 11 claim imposes strict liability on 
the person or persons responsible for the misstatement.  The presumption of 
reliance operates, however, under a 12-month prescriptive period. 
If such person acquired the security after the issuer has made 
generally available to its security holders an earning statement 
covering a period of at least twelve months beginning after the 
effective date of the registration statement, then the right of recovery 
under this subsection shall be conditioned on proof that such person 
acquired the security relying upon such untrue statement in the 
registration statement or relying upon the registration statement and 
not knowing of such omission, but such reliance may be established 
without proof of the reading of the registration statement by such 
person.85 
Professor O‘Hare has noted that this provision ―has been interpreted to 
mean that reliance upon the false or misleading statement appearing in the 
registration statement is presumed during the initial 12 month period following the 
effective date of the registration statement.‖86  In other words, ―there is a conclusive 
presumption of reliance for any person purchasing the security prior to the 
expiration of twelve months.‖87  After that period has concluded, the plaintiff must 
be able to show reliance in order to prevail on his claims under Section 11.88 
Thus, Section 11, by its explicit language, contemplates three distinct time 
periods.  First, it implies the pre-presumptive period, i.e., before a registration 
                                                   
84 See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text. 
85 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2009). 
86 Jennifer O‘Hare, Institutional Investors, Registration Rights, and the Specter of Liability Under Section 11 of the 
Securities Act of 1933, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 217, 226 n.36 (1996). 
87 2 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 7.3[4] (6th ed. 2008). 
88 Reliance may be established without proof of the reading of the registration statement by the 
investor.  See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a). 
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statement is issued.89  Second, it defines the presumptive period, i.e., between the 
time a registration statement is issued and the time an ―earning statement covering a 
period of at least twelve months beginning after the effective date of the registration 
statement‖ is issued.90  Third, it establishes the post-presumptive period, i.e., 
following the issuance of such an ―earning statement covering a period of at least 
twelve months beginning after the effective date of the registration statement.‖ 91  
During each of these periods, reasonable reliance must either be proven affirmatively 
or is an affirmative defense and can be refuted. 
The presumption of reliance in a Section 11 claim is a universal concept 
among courts across this country.92  It is in keeping with the congressional intent 
behind passage of the Securities Act and the furtherance of investor protection and 
fraud prevention that the Securities Act was designed to accomplish.  Despite the 
strict liability nature of a Section 11 claim, however, it is important to bear in mind 
that the presumption of reliance under Section 11 is just that – a presumption.  It does 
not mean that reliance is not an element of a Section 11 claim, nor does it mean that 
reliance is not part of a court‘s consideration of the issues at stake in the claim. 
Before considering whether the Section 11 presumption applies, we 
must address Plaintiffs‘ threshold argument.  Plaintiffs argue 
primarily that reliance is not an element of a Section 11 claim and, 
consequently, reliance is irrelevant to, and plays no role in, this case.  
That is only partly true. Plaintiffs are correct to the extent that 
reliance does not need to be proven (except post-earnings statement). 
Reliance is ordinarily presumed.93 
Congress developed the 12-month prescriptive period primarily as a means 
of guarding against market forces and fluctuations. 
                                                   
89 See id. 
90 See id. 
91 Id. 
92 See, e.g., Alpern v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 84 F.3d 1525, 1541 (8th Cir. 1996); Shaw v. Digital Equip. 
Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1223 (1st Cir. 1996); Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d at 269, 272 (2d Cir. 1967); In re 
AMF Bowling Sec. Litig., No. 99 Civ. 3023 (DC), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9076WL 1033826, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2002); Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 313, 317 (D. Colo. 1999); 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. ‗21‘ Int‘l Holdings, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
93 See APA IV, supra note 14, at 1271-72 (emphasis in original). 
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Congress realized that the price of securities fluctuates with 
information received by the market about a certain company.  
Without this provision, there could be an investor who only 
purchased securities from companies with known faulty registration 
statements.  By doing this, the investor would always be able to 
recover his purchase price from companies whose stock prices 
dropped, but keep those stocks whose prices went up.94 
Assuming that the securities at issue were not purchased beyond the 12-
month window, a plaintiff will be able to take advantage of the reliance presumption.  
Provided he can show that he purchased the security pursuant to a false or 
misleading registration statement, ―[l]iability against the issuer . . . is virtually 
absolute, even for innocent misstatements.‖95  In that event, he would not need to 
prove an independent reliance on the misstatement or other filing in contention.96 
As discussed below, the Eleventh Circuit‘s opinions in the APA case are a 
thorough and well reasoned application of the presumption of reliance to the 
particular facts at issue. 
A. APA Excelsior III L.P. v. Premiere Technologies, Inc., 
476 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2007).97 
This case arose out of a merger in which the plaintiffs were sophisticated 
―venture‖ investors and directors of Xpedite Systems, Inc. (―Xpedite‖), the publicly 
                                                   
94 James E. Shapiro, Hertzberg v. Dignity Partners, Inc.: Standing to Sue Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 
1933; Reflections on Gustafson, 15 BYU J. PUB. L. 117, 134-35 (2000). 
95 Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983). 
96 See, e.g., In re Am. Cont‘l Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1424, 1435 (D. Ariz. 
1992). 
A purchaser‘s reliance on the registration statement need not be proven unless the 
plaintiff ―acquired the security after the issuer made generally available to its 
security holders an earning statement covering a period of twelve months 
beginning after the effective date of the registration statement.‖ Section 77k further 
provides that reliance may be shown without proof that the plaintiff read the 
registration statement. 
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2009)). 
97 The authors of this article were defense counsel in the APA case. 
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traded target corporation.  The plaintiffs committed to acquire shares of Premiere 
Technologies, Inc. (―Premiere‖), the acquiring corporation, prior to the public 
offering of shares in conjunction with the merger.  After the merger, when Premiere 
experienced a temporary downturn, the plaintiffs sued Premiere and its officers 
under Section 11 and for negligent misrepresentation under state law. 98 
The plaintiffs were all former Xpedite shareholders who each held a large 
stake in the company.99  Certain of the plaintiffs were investment funds in the Alan 
Patricof family of funds and provided investment fund management services to 
large, sophisticated institutional investors.100  Robert Chefitz, an employee of the 
investment funds, was charged with monitoring the funds‘ investment in Xpedite.101  
He and another fund employee held seats on Xpedite‘s Board of Directors due to 
the funds‘ significant holdings in Xpedite.102  The remaining plaintiffs, Stuart and 
David Epstein, were brothers who made substantial venture investments in Xpedite 
as individual investors and as a result maintained a joint seat on Xpedite ‘s Board.103 
In February 1997, Xpedite‘s Board established a Special Committee to 
explore strategic alternatives to achieve liquidity for the large venture investors and 
value for public market shareholders.104  Both Chefitz and David Epstein were 
appointed to the Special Committee, which was assisted by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc. as its financial investment advisor, by Ernst & Young LLP as 
its audit advisor, and by Paul Hastings, Janofsky & Walker LLP for legal due 
diligence.105 
                                                   
98 The plaintiffs originally asserted Section 12 claims also, but expressly abandoned them during 
appellate oral argument.  See APA IV, supra note 14, at 1267 n.3.  The Section 15 claim, a derivative 
liability cause of action, was dismissed with the Section 11 claim.  See id. 
99 See APA IV, supra note 14, at 1263. 
100 See id. 
101 See id. 
102 See id. 
103 See id. 
104 See id. 
105 See id. at 1263-64. 
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In October 1997, Premiere expressed an interest in acquiring Xpedite.106  
Upon receipt of an offer from Premiere, the Special Committee was obligated to 
conduct a due diligence investigation into the offer and to make a recommendation 
to the Board.  Chefitz led the Committee‘s due diligence efforts, and the Committee, 
including David Epstein as a member, was given access to voluminous amounts of 
confidential and non-public information regarding Premiere.107  The Special 
Committee recommended to Xpedite‘s Board that the merger offer should be 
accepted, and the two companies agreed on a stock-for-stock transaction.108 
Separate from and prior to the public offering process that was to be 
associated with the merger, the plaintiffs executed Stockholder Agreements in 
November 1997.109  The Stockholder Agreements granted an irrevocable proxy to 
Premiere‘s Board of Directors to vote in favor of the merger, thereby reflecting the 
plaintiffs‘ investment decision as to Premiere.110  Also in November 1997, the 
plaintiffs executed Affiliate Letters, in which they agreed to the placement of a 
restrictive legend on their Premiere stock certificates.111  The Affiliate Letters 
provided, among other things, that the plaintiffs would be subject to a minimum of a 
30-day post-merger lock-up within which they were prohibited from selling their 
Premiere stock.112  The plaintiffs further agreed that Premiere was ―under no 
obligation to file a registration statement with the [SEC] covering the disposition of 
[their] shares.‖113  Thus, the plaintiffs conceded that their acquisition of shares was 
separate from the subsequent offering. 
In January 1998, Premiere filed a Registration Statement for the Xpedite 
merger with the Securities and Exchange Commission (―SEC‖), which became 
                                                   
106 See id. at 1263. 
107 See id. at 1264. 
108 See id. 
109 See id. at 1264-65. 
110 See id. at 1264. The SEC has recognized that executing such agreements could constitute an 
investment decision.  See Regulation of Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-7606A, 63 
Fed. Reg. 67,174-01, 67, 235-67, 236 (proposed Dec. 4, 1998). 
111 See APA IV, supra note 14, at 1264-65. 
112 See id.; APA I, supra note 14, at 31. 
113 APA IV, supra note 14, at 1265. 
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effective on January 28, 1998, and thereby initiated the public offering process.114  
Upon consummation of the merger on February 27, 1998, the plaintiffs enjoyed a 
500% return on their initial investment in Xpedite.115 
Later that year, in June 1998, ―Premiere announced that it would have a 
shortfall in its revenues, and that it would be taking a charge against its bad debt 
reserves.‖116  On the day of the announcement, the price of Premiere stock dropped 
by 28%, and the lawsuit was filed shortly thereafter.117 
After the completion of discovery, the defendants moved for summary 
judgment because the plaintiffs had made their investment decision to acquire the 
relevant shares before the allegedly fraudulent registration statement was issued. 118  
In addition, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing under the 
Securities Act because they had not acquired stock pursuant to a public offering, but 
had instead made their decision to invest based on access to inside information and 
advice from their lawyers and investment bankers.119  The defendants also asserted 
that, because the plaintiffs had failed to conduct effective due diligence, they could 
not justifiably rely on any representations by Premiere and, therefore, could not bring 
a claim for negligent misrepresentation.120 
Analyzing ―the entire context of the transaction,‖121 the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Georgia held that the plaintiffs‘ negligent 
misrepresentation claim failed.122  The Court held as follows: 
Plaintiffs cannot establish reasonable reliance on Defendants‘ alleged 
misrepresentations because Plaintiffs had notice of risk factors 
                                                   
114 See id. 
115 See id. at 1265 n.1. 
116 See id. at 1265. 
117 See id. 
118 See APA I, supra note 14, at 6. 
119 See id. at 7. 
120 See id. 
121 Id. at 12 (quoting Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt. LLC v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 2003 WL 
22053957, at *4 (2d Cir. Sept. 4, 2003)). 
122 Id. at 25. 
74           TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW           [VOL. 11 
related to the areas in which they contend Defendants provided 
inaccurate information; Plaintiffs [were] sophisticated parties and 
were represented by sophisticated legal and financial advisors; and 
Plaintiffs had access to information through the due diligence 
process, but did not seek information related to the areas of concern 
and did not negotiate specific warranties or representations from 
Premiere concerning these issues.123 
The Court also dismissed the Securities Act claims because ―it would not 
serve the purposes of the 1933 Act to allow sophisticated investors who had access 
to significant confidential and inside information through the exercise of due 
diligence rights to convert their acquisition of securities into a public offering by 
mere fact that Defendants provided a Registration Statement.‖124 
The plaintiffs appealed.125  As discussed below, the Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit was the first to recognize the impossibility of reliance defense under 
Section 11.126  The Court held that the logical scope of the presumption framework 
in Section 11 dictates that no liability may be imposed in any situation in which 
reliance would have been impossible, including where the plaintiffs made their 
investment decisions before the registration statement was issued or they should 
have known of the alleged misstatement at issue.127 
The Court analogized the factual circumstances before it to those of a 
plaintiff who acquires a security pursuant to a registration statement, but knows at 
the time of the acquisition of the untruths or omissions contained therein.128  
Because Section 11 permits an affirmative defense against such a plaintiff if reliance 
would have been unreasonable, the Court held that ―[i]n a case like the one currently 
before the Court, the purchaser committed to the sale before the alleged 
misstatements or omissions were made and therefore before such statements or 
                                                   
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 31. 
125 See APA IV, supra note 14, at 1266. 
126 See id. 
127 See APA II, supra note 14, at 12-17. 
128 See id. at 12-13. 
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omissions could have affected the price and played any role in the purchase 
decision.‖129 
The Court noted that an argument asserting that ―due to the tim[ing] of their 
investment decision, Plaintiffs could not possibly have relied on the registration 
statement and therefore should not be entitled to maintain their claims under Section 
11‖ was an ―attractive argument.‖130  The Court held as follows. 
Thus, the statute prevents recovery even during the initial period 
covered by the statute if reliance would have been unreasonable.  It is 
conceivable, therefore, that if a plaintiff committed to an acquisition 
prior to the filing of a registration statement – if reliance were a 
complete impossibility under any theory – he too should not be 
permitted to recover under Section 11.131 
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the negligent 
misrepresentation claim, but reversed and remanded the dismissal of the Section 11 
claim because it did not reach the merits of the application of the reliance defense 
and it rejected the defendants‘ argument that the Section 11 claim failed because 
there was no public offering.132 
On remand, the defendants renewed their motion for summary judgment.133  
The defendants argued that the Eleventh Circuit‘s guidance on the impossibility of 
reliance based on the timing of the plaintiffs‘ investment decision precluded their 
Section 11 claims.134  The district court followed the Eleventh Circuit‘s ―roadmap,‖ 
held that reliance was impossible, and dismissed the Section 11 claim. 135 
The plaintiffs appealed again.136  The Eleventh Circuit held that reliance was 
impossible and that no Section 11 claim could be asserted under the set of facts 
                                                   
129 Id. at 15. 
130 Id. at 12. 
131 Id. at 13. 
132 See id. at 23-24. 
133 See APA III, supra note 14, at 6. 
134 See id. 
135 See id. at 14. 
136 See APA IV, supra note 14, at 1267. 
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presented.137  In affirming the district court‘s opinion, the Eleventh Circuit stated 
initially that the ―statutory language must be read in the context of the purpose it was 
intended to serve.‖138  The Court rejected at the outset the plaintiffs‘ position that the 
timing of the investment decision was irrelevant.139  Instead, it deemed the plaintiffs 
to have conceded that the relevant investment decision was made before the 
registration statement was issued.140 
The Eleventh Circuit held that the insider plaintiffs did not reasonably rely 
on the allegedly false registration statement and squarely rejected the notion that 
reliance is not an element of Section 11.141  The Court held that, ―as a matter of 
common sense, Plaintiffs are not entitled to the presumption in light of the timing of 
their investment decision and commitment.  To hold otherwise would mean that an 
impossible fact will be presumed in Plaintiffs‘ favor.‖142 
The Court also held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the presumption 
of reliance because of their status as insiders and due diligence rights.143 
Plaintiffs had access to a wide range of information and knew of the 
stock issuance months before the registration statement was filed.  
They had the opportunity to learn (and, in fact, were on notice) of 
the potential problems with certain of Premiere‘s business 
relationships, its telephone calling card business, and the Orchestrate 
product of which they now complain.  Congress has noted that 
liability under Section 11 is imposed and justified because members 
of the public are presumed to be ―innocent‖ and, as compared with 
the issuers of stock, do not have the ―opportunity to learn the truth;‖ 
instead, they are merely reliant upon what they are told.  See S. Rep. 
No. 47 at 5.  Plaintiffs do not appear to fit that characterization. . . . 
                                                   
137 See id. at 1277. 
138 Id. at 1268 (quoting United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218, 1237 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 
546 U.S. 829 (2005)). 
139 See id. at 1269-70. 
140 See id. 
141 See id. at 1277. 
142 Id. at 1273. 
143 Id. at 1277. 
2010]              DEFENSES TO CLAIMS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933               77 
 
 
In sum, we hold that the Section 11 presumption of reliance does not 
apply in the limited and narrow situation where sophisticated 
investors participating in an arms-length corporate merger make a 
legally binding investment commitment months before the filing of a 
defective registration statement.144 
Thus, where reliance is an impossibility due to the timing of the 
plaintiff‘s investment decision, a Section 11 claim should fail as a matter of 
law under the APA case. 
B. Constructive Knowledge Defense Under Section 11 
Another important aspect of the APA case was the extent to which 
constructive knowledge of the alleged misstatement provides a defense under 
Section 11.  As discussed above, both Sections 11 and 12 provide a defense based on 
knowledge of the plaintiff.145  Actual knowledge is an obvious concept, but it is 
difficult to prove in reality because one cannot ―get in the mind‖ of the plaintiff.  
Constructive knowledge is the more practical notion and, thus, is espoused 
widely in the law.  Constructive knowledge is defined as ―[k]nowledge that one using 
reasonable care or diligence should have, and therefore is attributed by law to a given 
person.‖146  Constructive knowledge exists for the following two essential purposes:  
(1) it prevents individuals from turning a blind eye to initial signs of trouble; and (2) 
it recognizes that proving actual knowledge is next to impossible.147 
                                                   
144 Id.  The court also noted correctly that the concept of ―tracing‖ substantiates this reading of 
Section 11.  See id. at 1276.  In other words, under Section 11, a plaintiff must be able to trace the 
security and purchase to the defective registration statement in order to induce liability.  See DeMaria 
v. Andersen, 318 F.3d 170, 176 (2d Cir. 2003); Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 873 (5th 
Cir. 2003); Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 269 (2d Cir. 1967).  Where the plaintiff had actual or 
constructive knowledge, such necessary links to the registration statement are impossible. 
145 See supra notes 62-64, 76-78 and accompanying text. 
146 BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 876 (7th ed. 1999). 
147 See Alan C. Michaels, Acceptance: The Missing Mental State, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 953, 957, 978-79 (1998); 
Robert B. Edesess, Jr., The End of Innocence: An Actual Knowledge Threshold for Intermediaries Holding 
Fiduciaries’/Clients’ Assets, 2 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 377, 406-07 (2004). 
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This concept of constructive knowledge, however, is rarely used in defending 
against a Section 11 claim.148  Defendants should recognize the role of such 
constructive knowledge in Section 11 and advocate against liability where reliance, as 
a result, would be unreasonable. 
A defense under Section 11 for a plaintiff‘s actual or constructive knowledge 
of an alleged misrepresentation would not be an anomaly.  There are several parallels 
in the law.  Actual knowledge and constructive knowledge, contemplating an 
objective reasonable person standard, appear in several facets of commercial and 
securities law. 
The concept of knowledge plays a role in securities fraud actions under 
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.149  
Severe recklessness, which suggests that an individual should have known of an act 
or statement, is enough to make the required showing of scienter, or knowledge, 
under those provisions.150  The Eleventh Circuit held as follows: 
Severe recklessness is limited to those highly unreasonable omissions 
or misrepresentations that involve not merely simple or even 
inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards 
of ordinary care, and that present a danger of misleading buyers or 
sellers which is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that 
the defendant must have been aware of it.151 
Section 20(e) of the Securities Exchange Act, under which the SEC can bring 
aiding and abetting actions, provides another example.152  That section expressly 
provides that 
[a]ny person that knowingly provides substantial assistance to another 
                                                   
148 Courts have held that constructive knowledge cannot be used as a defense to a Section 12 claim.  
See, e.g., Casella v. Webb, 883 F.2d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1989) (―Constructive knowledge cannot bar a 
purchaser‘s recovery under section 12(2).‖); Parkhurst v. N. Am. Fin. Servs. Cos., 919 F. Supp. 270, 
275 (E.D. Mich. 1996). 
149 See generally Keith A. Rowley, Cause of Action for Securities Fraud Under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities 
Exchange Act and/or Rule 10b-5, 9 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 271 (2006). 
150 See Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1283 (11th Cir. 1999). 
151 Id. at 1282 n.18 (quoting Broad v. Rockwell Int‘l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 961-62 (5th Cir. 1981) (en 
banc)). 
152 See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2009). 
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person in violation of a provision of this chapter, or of any rule or 
regulation issued under this chapter, shall be deemed to be in 
violation of such provision to the same extent as the person to whom 
such assistance is provided.153 
Courts have interpreted this to mean that, under certain circumstances, 
―‗recklessness is enough‘ to satisfy the knowledge element.‖154  In the same vein, the 
statute of limitations for securities fraud claims starts to run upon either actual or 
constructive knowledge of the alleged misstatement by the plaintiff.  To trigger the 
running of the statute, inquiry notice is the same as actual notice.155  ―Inquiry notice‖ 
is ―‗the term used for knowledge of facts that would lead a reasonable person to 
begin investigating the possibility that his legal rights had been infringed.‘ . . . Inquiry 
notice is triggered by evidence of the possibility of fraud, not full exposition of the 
scam itself.‖156  Therefore, even though a person does not have actual knowledge of 
a fraudulent act, the statute of limitations for securities fraud is triggered when she 
should have known of it.  Section 13 of the Securities Act, which codifies the 
limitation, provides that the statute of limitations starts to run upon either ―discovery 
of the untrue statement or the omission, or after such discovery should have been 
made by the exercise of reasonable diligence.‖157 
State law fraud or negligent misrepresentation cases also turn on due 
diligence and constructive knowledge.158  ―Each party to a transaction is under a duty 
to exercise reasonable diligence to protect himself and to make proper inquiry to 
ascertain the truth.‖159  In APA II, the Court held that the plaintiffs failed to exercise 
their due diligence rights ―in a meaningful way‖ because they failed to ask the right 
questions, did not negotiate for warranties, and failed to probe the technology 
                                                   
153 Id. (emphasis added). 
154 See SEC v. Treadway, 430 F. Supp. 2d 293, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting Armstrong v. McAlphin, 
699 F.2d 79, 91 (2d Cir. 1983)); see, e.g., SEC v. Iannelli, No. 74 Civ. 3417, 1975 WL 348, at *1, 5 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 1975). 
155 See Franze v. Equitable Assurance, 296 F.3d 1250, 1254 (11th Cir. 2002). 
156 Theoharous v. Fong, 256 F.3d 1219, 1228 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Kauthar SDN BHD v. 
Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 670 (7th Cir. 1998)) (emphasis in original). 
157 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2009). 
158 See APA II, supra note 14, at 18-19. 
159 CHARLES R. ADAMS III, GEORGIA LAW OF TORTS § 32-4 (2009-10 ed.). 
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products upon which the acquiring corporation was built.160  The Court also held 
that the plaintiffs should have been on notice of potential problems, which were 
disclosed by the acquiring corporation in its public filings.161 
These examples illustrate that knowledge includes both actual knowledge and 
constructive knowledge in many facets of the law.  Absent such a comprehensive 
concept of knowledge, parties would be substantially prejudiced by the inherent 
difficulty of entering into an individual‘s mind to determine what she or he actually 
knew.  Limiting actual knowledge also would facilitate the shunning of responsibility.  
Such practical concerns warrant limitation of Section 11 liability where either actual 
or constructive knowledge exists. 
As discussed above, the constructive knowledge defense to Section 11 
liability was presented to the Eleventh Circuit in APA II and APA IV.162  The 
defendants argued that the plaintiffs were corporate insiders who failed to 
thoroughly exercise due diligence rights prior to making any decision to invest in 
Premiere stock.163  The Court agreed and held that ―a plaintiff may not recover under 
Section 11 if it ‗knew [of] or had available‘ information that would have revealed the 
untruth or omission contained in the registration statement.‖164 
Incorporating a constructive knowledge defense into Section 11 and 
precluding liability where the plaintiff knew or should have known of the alleged 
misrepresentation is also consistent with recent public policy articulations as to the 
additional ―gatekeeping‖ responsibilities shouldered by those who typically find 
themselves foreclosed by this defense, such as insiders.165  Under both the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and its subsequent applications, fiduciary duties have surpassed a simple 
monitoring model to encompass an increased emphasis on active gatekeeping and 
engagement. 
                                                   
160 APA II, supra note 14, at 19-20. 
161 See id. at 20-23. 
162 See discussion supra Section IV(B). 
163 APA II, supra note 14, at 16-17, 19-24. 
164 APA IV, supra note 14, at 1277 (quoting Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. 
Supp. 544, 575 (E.D.N.Y. 1971)) (emphasis in original). 
165 See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
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Today, businesses operate in an environment of raised professional, legal, 
and ethical standards.  In the SEC chairman ‘s own words, directors 
must redefine corporate governance with practices that go beyond 
mere adherence to new rules and demonstrate ethics, integrity, 
honesty, and transparency . . . .  Directors must ensure that they 
remain the true stewards of corporate accountability, and their 
actions must demonstrate their dedication to this stewardship 
without undue interference . . . . 166 
Indeed, recent corporate governance principles align greatly with the 
purposes of the Securities Act, and individuals tasked with due diligence need do far 
more than a mere formalized check and balance on corporate transactions. 
As discussed above, inside, sophisticated, or due diligence-empowered 
investors are not the type to whom the Securities Act affords protection.  To the 
contrary, these are corporate actors upon whom the SEC relies to be the stewards of 
corporate governance, to establish an ethical ―tone at the top[,]‖ and to protect the 
interests of public market shareholders.167  The goal is to achieve a value-based 
system that moves beyond technical compliance with the law and towards directors 
acting in an intellectually independent and diligent manner to promote the spirit of 
the securities laws. 
There has also been a recent spate of high profile cases in which the 
Delaware courts and others have struggled with the issue of directors‘ fiduciary 
duties to the shareholders of public companies.168  Limiting the scope of Section 11 
liability for constructive knowledge would support these corporate governance 
trends.  It would remove any artificial incentives for inside investors to abandon their 
                                                   
166 William H. Donaldson, Chairman, SEC, Remarks Before the Directors Education Institute (Mar. 
16, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch031605whd.htm. 
167 William H. Donaldson, Chairman, SEC, Remarks Before the Foreign Policy Association, 2003 WL 
23638628 (Sept. 25, 2003); see also Cynthia A. Glassman, Commissioner, SEC, Remarks Before the 
Aspen Institute Italia Seminars for Leaders, 2003 WL 23638648 (Nov. 7, 2003); William H. 
Donaldson, Chairman, SEC, Remarks from Directors College at Stanford University Law School, 
2004 WL 1571974 (June 20, 2004). 
168 See, e.g., Beam v. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc., 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004); In re Oracle 
Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 
A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003); In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 258 F. Supp. 2d 576 
(S.D. Tex. 2003). 
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obligations to access sufficient information in order to protect public shareholders.  
These interpretations would enhance the private policing system that the SEC is 
actively promoting and strengthening. 
V. LOSS CAUSATION UNDER SECTIONS 11 AND 12 
A. Statutory Framework 
As noted above, lack of loss causation is an affirmative defense under 
Section 11.169  ―[D]efendants can limit damages by showing that the plaintiffs‘ losses 
were caused by something other than their misrepresentations.‖ 170  In other words, 
[u]nder § 11, defendants are liable only for the losses caused by 
material misrepresentations or omissions in the registration 
statement. Once the plaintiff has established damages, the defendant 
may prove that all or part of those damages were caused by factors 
other than those misrepresentations or omissions.  Thus, while in the 
                                                   
169 The statute states: 
The suit authorized under subsection (a) of this section may be to recover such 
damages as shall represent the difference between the amount paid for the security 
(not exceeding the price at which the security was offered to the public) and (1) the 
value thereof as of the time such suit was brought, or (2) the price at which such 
security shall have been disposed of in the market before suit, or (3) the price at 
which such security shall have been disposed of after suit but before judgment if 
such damages shall be less than the damages representing the difference between 
the amount paid for the security (not exceeding the price at which the security was 
offered to the public) and the value thereof as of the time such suit was brought:  
Provided, that if the defendant proves that any portion or all of such damages represents other than 
the depreciation in value of such security resulting from such part of the registration statement, with 
respect to which his liability is asserted, not being true or omitting to state a material fact required 
to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, such portion of or 
all such damages shall not be recoverable. 
15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (2009) (emphasis added). 
170 See In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261, 274 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Bastian v. Petren Res. 
Corp., 892 F.2d 680, 685 (7th Cir. 1990); Smith v. Suprema Specialties, Inc., No. 02-168(WHW), 2007 
WL 1217980, at *6-7 (D. N.J. Apr. 23, 2007) (―Loss causation is a statutory affirmative defense for 
Section 11 and Section 12(a)(2) claims, and so is not an element of a prima facie case.‖); Madden v. 
Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 118 F. App‘x 150, 153-54 (9th Cir. 2004) (―Lack of causation of loss is an 
affirmative defense to § 11 claims.‖). 
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§ 10(b) context it is the plaintiff who must prove loss causation, in 
the § 11 context it is the defendant who has the burden of proving 
that his misdeeds were not the cause of the losses.171 
In reality, the loss causation requirement under Section 11 represents a 
shifting of the burden from the plaintiff‘s proof to an affirmative aspect of the 
issuer‘s defense.  The requirement enables the defendant to take stock of the 
circumstances surrounding the issuance of the securities, and to account for other 
potential causes of the loss that the plaintiff claims to have sustained.  If the 
defendant can prove that the loss ―did not result from his misconduct,‖ the 
plaintiff‘s claim under Section 11 is fatally flawed.172 
The concept of loss causation itself stems from the language contained 
directly within the text of Section 11.  To prevail on the affirmative defense, the 
issuer or other defendant must be able to show that the loss sustained by the 
plaintiff, such as a decline in stock prices, resulted from factors other than the alleged 
false or misleading registration statement.173  This may be demonstrated in the form 
of expert testimony, including market valuations, analyses, stock trends, purchasing 
history, adjustments, and other related areas.  It may also be proven based on the 
undisputed facts of public record regarding, inter alia, the information in the market, 
the reasons for the stock price decline, or the lack of a stock price reaction.  Thus, 
loss causation is an appropriate ground for dismissal at the motion to dismiss or 
summary judgment stage where it is lacking as a matter of law based on the 
undisputed facts.174 
Section 12 is similar to Section 11.  As noted previously, unlike Section 10(b), 
Section 12 also does not require the plaintiff to prove loss causation.  ―‗The buyer 
                                                   
171 Hayes v. Arthur Young & Co., No. 91-15531, 1994 WL 463493, at *10 (9th Cir. Aug. 26, 1994). 
172 Campbell v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., No. 85-1703, 1987 WL 44742, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 9, 
1987) (―[A] defendant is not liable for damages which he can prove did not result from his 
misconduct.‖). 
173 See Madden, 118 F. App‘x at 154. 
174 See, e.g., Azzolini v. Corts Trust II for Provident Fin. Trust I, No. 103CV1003, 2005 WL 3448053, 
at *5-6 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 14, 2005); In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 272 F. 
Supp. 2d 243, 253-55 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Cats v. Protection One, Inc., No. CV99-3755-DTRCX, 2001 
WL 34070755, at *11 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2001), rev’d on other grounds, Garbini v. Protection One, Inc., 49 
F. App‘x 169 (9th Cir. 2002); In re Fortune Sys. Sec. Litig., 680 F. Supp. 1360, 1364-68 (N.D. Cal. 
1987); see also APA IV, supra note 14, at 1277 n.8. 
84           TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW           [VOL. 11 
need not show any causal connection between the misrepresentation and his damage; 
indeed, he need not even show that he has been damaged.‘‖ 175  However, as with 
Section 11, the defendant can defeat a claim under Section 12 if he can show that the 
loss sustained by the plaintiff was not the result of the alleged misrepresentations or 
omissions. 
In an action described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, if the 
person who offered or sold such security proves that any portion or 
all of the amount recoverable under subsection (a)(2) of this section 
represents other than the depreciation in value of the subject security 
resulting from such part of the prospectus or oral communication, 
with respect to which the liability of that person is asserted, not being 
true or omitting to state a material fact required to be stated therein 
or necessary to make the statement not misleading, then such portion 
or amount, as the case may be, shall not be recoverable.176 
Moreover, although the plaintiff does not have an obligation to plead loss 
causation in the complaint, dismissal of a securities action under Section 12 is 
appropriate when it is apparent as a matter of law that the loss is not attributable to 
the alleged misrepresentations or omissions.177  Beyond the dismissal stage, the 
defendant also can make use of expert testimony to demonstrate the absence of a 
link between the alleged misstatement or omission and the subsequent decline in the 
value of the plaintiff‘s securities.178  As discussed below, the Supreme Court held in 
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo that there often are several possible explanations 
for a decline in the value of securities, and thus it is not necessarily true that the 
                                                   
175 Beloit Corp. v. Emett & Chandler Cos., No. 90-55154, 1991 WL 153459, at *4 (9th Cir. Aug. 14, 
1991) (quoting LOUIS LOSS, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 873 (2d ed. 1988)); Casella 
v. Webb, 883 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1989); LOUIS LOSS, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION 1200-01 (15th ed. 2003) [hereinafter LOSS]. 
176 15 U.S.C. § 77l(b) (2009). 
177 See Azzolini, 2005 WL 3448053, at *5; see also Pani v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 152 F.3d 67, 
74-75 (2d Cir. 1998); Hoover v. Langston Equip. Assocs., Inc., 958 F.2d 742, 745 (6th Cir. 1992); In re 
WRT Energy Sec. Litig., No. 96 Civ. 3610 (JFK), 2005 WL 323729, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2005); In 
re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 272 F. Supp. 2d 243, 253-54 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); 5 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1277 (3d ed. 
2004). 
178 See, e.g., Carpe v. Aquila, Inc., No. 02-0388-CV-W-FJG, 2005 WL 1138833, at *2-4 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 
23, 2005). 
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alleged misstatement or omission was the actual cause of the loss. 179  In some 
instances, the defendant may even be able to show that the plaintiff did not actually 
sustain a loss at all, but instead experienced a gain on the value of his securities.180  In 
either event, the affirmative defense of loss causation is an effective tool to combat a 
Section 12 claim. 
B. Loss Causation under Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) 
In Dura, the Supreme Court confirmed that an inflated purchase price alone 
will not ipso facto amount to or proximately cause the economic loss needed to allege 
and prove loss causation under a Section 10(b) claim.181  Rather, the plaintiff must 
show that the defendant‘s misrepresentation, or other fraudulent conduct, 
proximately caused the economic loss.182 
As set forth above, Section 11 and Section 12 plaintiffs do not have to plead 
or prove loss causation as part of a prima facie case.183  Instead, the burden shifts to 
the defendant to show that the loss was the result of something other than the 
defendant‘s misrepresentations or omissions.184  In that regard, the rule set forth in 
Dura would have no technical bearing on claims brought under Section 11 and 
Section 12, but Dura nevertheless is instructive for the guidance it can offer to 
defendants in formulating their affirmative defense.  Notably, the Supreme Court 
observed as follows: 
For one thing, as a matter of pure logic, at the moment the 
transaction takes place, the plaintiff has suffered no loss; the inflated 
                                                   
179 See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342-43 (2005). 
180 See, e.g., Hicks v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 01 Civ. 10071 (HB), 2003 WL 21672085, at *4-5 
(S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2003). 
181 Dura Pharms., Inc., 544 U.S. at 346-47. 
182 See id. at 346. 
183 See In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261, 274 (3d Cir. 2005); Madden v. Deloitte & Touche, 
LLP, 118 F. App‘x 150, 153-54 (9th Cir. 2004); Beloit Corp. v. Emett & Chandler Cos., No. 90-55154, 
1991 WL 153459, at *4 (9th Cir. Aug. 14, 1991); Bastian v. Petren Res. Corp., 892 F.2d 680, 685 (7th 
Cir. 1990); Casella v. Webb, 883 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1989); Smith v. Suprema Specialties, Inc., No. 
02-168 (WHW), 2007 WL 1217980, at *6-7 (D. N.J. Apr. 23, 2007); LOSS, supra note 175, at 873. 
184 See, e.g., In re Merck, 432 F.3d at 274 (―[D]efendants can limit damages by showing that the 
plaintiffs‘ losses were caused by something other than their misrepresentations.‖). 
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purchase payment is offset by ownership of a share that at that instant 
possesses equivalent value.  Moreover, the logical link between the 
inflated share purchase price and any later economic loss is not 
invariably strong.  Shares are normally purchased with an eye toward 
a later sale.  But if, say, the purchaser sells the shares quickly before 
the relevant truth begins to leak out, the misrepresentation will not 
have led to any loss.  If the purchaser sells later after the truth makes 
its way into the market place, an initially inflated purchase price might 
mean a later loss.  But that is far from inevitably so.  When the 
purchaser subsequently resells such shares, even at a lower price, that 
lower price may reflect, not the earlier misrepresentation, but 
changed economic circumstances, changed investor expectations, 
new industry-specific or firm-specific facts, conditions, or other 
events, which taken separately or together account for some or all of 
that lower price.  (The same is true in respect to a claim that a share‘s 
higher price is lower than it would otherwise have been – a claim we 
do not consider here.)  Other things being equal, the longer the time 
between purchase and sale, the more likely that this is so, i.e., the 
more likely that other factors caused the loss.185 
Dura acknowledges the existence of many different possible causes of a 
decline in stock price, and the defendant has these alternate causes at his disposal in 
defending against a plaintiff‘s charge that the defendant‘s misrepresentations or 
omissions resulted in the stock price decline.  Shifts in economic circumstances or 
investor expectations may have been the proximate cause of the ultimate decline in 
share price, or it may have been attributable to a fundamental change in the industry 
itself.  Whatever the reason, the decline in stock price does not necessarily have to 
result from a defendant‘s misrepresentation or omissions, as the Supreme Court in 
Dura acknowledges. 
C. Loss Causation Defense Applied in APA 
The principles espoused by Dura were presented to the district court in APA 
in the Section 11 context.  The defendants argued that there had been no financial 
restatement, and the plaintiffs had proffered no evidence to link the stock price drop 
                                                   
185 Dura Pharms., Inc., 544 U.S. at 342-43 (emphasis in original). 
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and their purported damages to any alleged misstatement.186  The plaintiffs argued in 
response that loss causation was not their burden, and that disproving it was the 
defendants‘ burden.187  The defendants responded that, regardless of whose burden it 
was, the court should grant summary judgment, because loss causation was 
impossible as a matter of law because the plaintiffs made their investment decision 
before the registration statement was issued, and thus before the alleged 
misstatements were made.188 
The district court agreed with the defendants, holding that because the 
plaintiffs made their investment decision before the allegedly misleading registration 
statement was issued, and because they had due diligence rights, the alleged 
misstatements could not have caused their loss.189  The district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants because the ―[p]laintiffs‘ [Section] 11 
claim suffer[ed] from an impossibility of reliance and inability to establish loss 
causation.‖190 
APA demonstrates that loss causation under Section 11 follows the same 
rationale as Dura.191  Although loss causation is a defense, rather than an affirmative 
element, under Section 11, it is an appropriate basis for dismissal if it is lacking as a 
matter of law. 
VI. TRUTH-ON-THE-MARKET DEFENSE 
A. The Truth-on-the-Market Doctrine 
The ―truth-on-the-market‖ doctrine serves as the inverse counterpart to the 
―fraud-on-the-market‖ theory, which is commonly used to establish the reliance 
element for a claim brought under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act. 192  In its most 
                                                   
186 See APA III, supra note 14, at 6. 
187 See id. 
188 See id. at 6, 15. 
189 See id. at 15-16. 
190 Id. at 16. 
191 See APA IV, supra note 14, at 1277 n.8. 
192 The ―fraud-on-the-market‖ theory provides that a misrepresentation or omission will affect the 
price of securities that are traded in an efficient market, and an investor will be able to rely on the 
88           TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW           [VOL. 11 
basic form, the doctrine provides that a misrepresentation cannot be considered 
―material‖ for purposes of establishing liability under Section 10(b) if the 
information constituting the misrepresentation is already known to the market. 193 
The typical fact pattern in securities fraud cases involves either an overly 
inflated or significantly undervalued stock price caused by the misrepresentation or 
omission that the defendant placed into the market through public disclosures, such 
as a registration statement, conference call, or SEC filings.  The market reacts to the 
fraudulent statement, and the stock price is based on the extent of the 
―misinformation‖ in the market; when the truth ultimately is revealed, the market 
again reacts, and the stock price declines.194  Even if the defendant made 
misstatements, it can avoid liability by demonstrating that the stock price decline was 
not the result of its misstatements, but was due to other causes, such as a shift in 
economic circumstances or investor expectations.195 
The ―truth-on-the-market‖ doctrine operates under the same reasoning, but 
results in a different outcome.  In the truth-on-the-market scenario, the stock price 
in the market is based on truthful information that is publicly available. 196  If 
investors elect to purchase or sell their stock, and they suffer a loss as a result of a 
stock price decline or inflation, there should be no liability because all of the 
information surrounding the company was truthful and fully available in the 
market.197 
The defendant can demonstrate that the alleged misrepresentations did not 
affect the market price of the securities, and thus the market could not have relied on 
the misrepresentations, because the truth of the matter was already known. 198  The 
main inquiry in assessing the impact of the doctrine is the manner in which the 
                                                                                                                                           
integrity of the market in purchasing the securities.  See Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 
745-46 (11th Cir. 1984). 
193 See Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 167 (2d Cir. 2000); Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 
1478, 1492 (9th Cir. 1996); Associated Randall Bank v. Griffin, Kubik, Stephens & Thompson, Inc., 3 
F.3d 208, 213-14 (7th Cir. 1993). 
194 See, e.g., Dura Pharms. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 338-40, 347 (2005). 
195 See id. at 338, 347. 
196 See Ganino, 228 F.3d at 167. 
197 See id. 
198 See id.; Provenz, 102 F.3d at 1492; Associated Randall Bank, 3 F.3d at 213-14. 
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―truth‖ found its way into the market.  ―Prompt incorporation of news into stock 
price is the foundation for the fraud-on-the-market doctrine and therefore supports 
a truth-on-the-market doctrine as well.‖199  To avail himself of the doctrine, the 
defendant must be prepared to show the extent of the efforts that were made to 
introduce the ―truth‖ to the public.200 
Even in a fraud on the market case, corporate insiders are not 
relieved of their duty to disclose material information where that 
information has received only brief mention in a few poorly-
circulated or lightly-regarded publications.  The investing public 
justifiably places heavy reliance on the statements and opinions of 
corporate insiders.  In order to avoid Rule 10b-5 liability, any material 
information which insiders fail to disclose must be transmitted to the 
public with a degree of intensity and credibility sufficient to effectively counter-
balance any misleading impression created by the insiders’ one-sided 
representations.201 
B. Truth-on-the-Market Defense Applied to Section 11 Cases 
As discussed above, the truth-on-the-market doctrine precludes liability 
where the purportedly injured party knew or should have known of the information 
that allegedly resulted in the injury.  This fundamental principle plays an explicit and 
implicit role in Section 11‘s liability scheme. 
Section 11‘s presumption of reliance stems from the notion that a misleading 
registration statement is considered to constitute fraud on the market due to the 
immediate spread of information.202  Thus, proof of reading a registration statement 
may not be required in certain circumstances, because even those who did not read 
the registration statement would have suffered an impact when the misleading 
disclosure affected the value of the stock.203 
                                                   
199 Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 516 (7th Cir. 1989); accord In re Apple 
Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 1989); Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 
1179-80 (7th Cir. 1987); Rodman v. Grant Found., 608 F.2d 64, 70 (2d Cir. 1979). 
200 In re Apple Computer, 886 F.2d at 1116. 
201 Id. (emphasis added); see also Ganino, 228 F.3d at 167. 
202 See APA IV, supra note 14, at 1275, 1277. 
203 See id. 
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The necessary corollary of this rationale is that there are instances in which 
the fraud-on-the-market theory is inapplicable.  Such instances include those in 
which (1) the truthful information is already in the market, i.e., the truth-on-the-
market scenario; (2) an individual was not entitled to rely on the efficient market; or 
(3) an individual could not have read the registration statement because it did not 
exist.  In such instances, true reliance is impossible, and any presumption is 
foreclosed. 
In addition, if the information relating to the alleged misstatement is in the 
public domain via other sources, including the issuer‘s disclosures or the media, 
either the truth-on-the-market or the constructive knowledge defense may apply.204  
One can envision several factual scenarios where ―soft information‖ related to the 
issuer‘s business, which the plaintiff claims was not disclosed by the issuer, was in 
the market already, thus precluding a claim.  As discussed below, several real world 
case examples are illustrative as to how these defenses may work to foreclose a 
Section 11 claim. 
As discussed above, in In re Mirant Corp. Securities Litigation, the plaintiffs 
alleged that Mirant‘s initial public offering registration statement and prospectus 
were misleading because they failed to disclose Mirant‘s alleged misconduct in the 
California energy crisis during the summers of 2000 and 2001.205  The California 
energy crisis and the resulting governmental proceedings and private lawsuits were 
widely publicized in the media and fully disclosed in Mirant ‘s public filings.206  In an 
early opinion regarding the first round of motion-to-dismiss briefing, the court 
assessed whether the plaintiffs‘ claims were time barred by the statute of 
limitations.207  In doing so, the court discussed at length Mirant‘s disclosures, articles 
in the media, and other information in the public domain regarding the California 
energy crisis and Mirant‘s alleged role in it.208  Such a factual scenario, where the 
pertinent information was widely disclosed as alleged by the complaint, would be one 
                                                   
204 See Ganino, 228 F.3d at 167. 
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Jan. 7, 2009); In re Mirant Corp. Sec. Litig., No. Civ. A. 1:02-CV-1467, 2003 WL 24027927, at *1 
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in which a truth-on-the-market defense could apply to preclude a Section 11 claim 
because any alleged misstatements by Mirant could not have been relied on by the 
market because the truth was already known.209  Moreover, the plaintiffs‘ 
constructive knowledge of the facts in the public domain should also bar their 
Section 11 claim under the knowledge defense in Section 11(e).210  Assuming arguendo 
that Mirant‘s disclosures were false as to its manipulation of the energy markets, the 
allegations in the governmental proceedings, private lawsuits, and the press would 
have provided a reasonable investor with knowledge of the misstatement.  
Another example of where the truth-on-the-market and constructive 
knowledge defenses may be applicable is presented by the facts of In re Prestige Brands 
Holdings, Inc.211  In Prestige Brands, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to 
disclose that sales of a particular product were declining.212  In fact, the prospectus 
disclosed the declining sales in detail in several places. 213  The court dismissed the 
plaintiffs‘ Section 10(b) fraud claims based on the alleged declining sales because 
―[a]ny reasonable investor or potential investor reading the Prospectus thus knew, or 
reasonably should have known, that Comet products had not been performing as 
profitably as they once did.‖214  Accordingly, the detailed disclosures precluded the 
plaintiffs‘ claims.215 
The Prestige Brands court reached the correct result and it confirmed the 
notion that disclosures about the alleged misstatement will bar a securities claim. 216  
The truth-on-the-market and constructive knowledge defenses, however, would also 
work to preclude Section 11 claims where the information was in the market by way 
of the company‘s detailed disclosures. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Section 11 claims that sound in fraud should be dismissed if they are not pled 
with particularity under Rule 9(b).  After the motion to dismiss stage, however, 
claims under Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act are sometimes viewed as 
difficult to get dismissed via dispositive motion before trial because they have a 
lower burden of proof with regard to the substantive elements than do fraud claims 
under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.  There are, however, several explicit and 
implicit defenses available under the statutes or relevant precedent that should be 
considered at summary judgment, or even earlier procedural stages of the litigation, if 
the undisputed facts in the complaint or the public domain support the defenses.  As 
recognized by the Eleventh Circuit in the APA case, the defenses of lack of reliance, 
constructive knowledge, and loss causation are not foreclosed to defendants until a 
trial on the merits. 
